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The Upside of Government Default
By Jeffrey Rogers Hummel
Thursday, February 16, 2012
Filed under: Economic Policy
There is a good chance that the U.S. government will be forced to
default on its explicit and implicit promises within the next few
decades. Fortunately, the state government experience of the
1840s suggests that this may provide the best and most durable
long-run solution.
Few now doubt that the U.S. government is rushing
headlong toward a major fiscal crisis. An outright
default by the U.S. government on Treasury
securities looks increasingly likely. Most
automatically conclude that such an outcome would
be catastrophic. But one striking historical case,
from the early history of the United States,
dramatically contradicts this common
presupposition. Indeed, it suggests that, in the long
run, default can usher in such desirable results as
decreasing government intervention and expanding
prosperity. The case involves not the default of the national government but of several state
governments in the 1840s.
After the War of 1812, New York state began construction of a canal connecting the Hudson River
with the Great Lakes. The Erie Canal, completed in 1825, was one of those rare and curious
instances where a socialist enterprise actually made a good profit, and it encouraged other states
to emulate New York. An orgy of canal building resulted. Usually, state governments owned and
operated these new canals. In those few instances where the canals were privately owned, the
states contributed the largest share of the financing. By 1840, the canal boom had blessed the
United States with 3,326 miles of mostly economically unjustified canals at an expense to the
states of $125 million, a large sum in those days. Virtually all the new canals were a waste of
resources and did not deliver the hoped-for monetary returns. Instead, the heavy state investments,
when added to budget growth stimulated by the War of 1812, led to massive borrowing.1
Then, in May of 1837, a major financial panic engulfed the country’s 800 banks, forcing all but six to
cease redeeming their banknotes and deposits for gold or silver coins. The panic brought on a
sharp depression that was quickly over.2 Amazingly, after the recovery, the outstanding
indebtedness of states nearly doubled, with a third of that invested in state-chartered banks in the
Midwest and South.3 By the end of 1839, a second bank suspension spread to half the country’s
banks. Over the next four years, nearly a quarter of state banks failed, the country’s total money
stock (M2) declined by one-third, and prices plummeted by 42 percent.4 Needless to say, the state
governments faced financial stringency, and during the deflation of 1839-1843, many became
desperate. By 1844, $60 million worth of state improvement bonds were in default. Four states—
Louisiana, Arkansas, Michigan, and Mississippi—as well as the territory of Florida eventually
repudiated debts outright, while four others—Maryland, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Indiana—
defaulted temporarily. New York and Ohio escaped similar straits only by taking extraordinary
measures.5
The Whig Party, under the leadership of Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky, saw the 1837 depression
and the subsequent state defaults as a heaven-sent opportunity for a national bailout. They
proposed in Congress that the national government assume the states’ debts. Clay's party also
advocated a national bankruptcy law that would allow individual debtors to voluntarily escape their
obligations. But the Democrats, under the inspired leadership of Martin Van Buren, who had been
elected president in 1836, not only blocked these initiatives but pushed government involvement in
the opposite direction. Although total national expenditures suddenly spiked to $37.2 million in
1837, overall they declined through Van Buren's four years, from $30.9 million in 1836 to $24.3
million in 1840. That represents a 21 percent fall in nominal terms, no more than half as much if you
adjust for price changes, but somewhere in between if you also adjust for population growth or the
economy's size.6
Many of these federal spending cuts came in the realm of internal improvements, especially for
rivers and harbors. As for revenue, tariff rates were already falling as a result of programmed
reductions worked out during a previous compromise. The national government’s only other source
of revenue at the time was the sale of public land. So the president threw his weight behind two
measures that would bring the allocation of public land into closer alignment with the homestead
principle: preemption, giving settlers who cultivated the land first option to buy, and graduation,
reducing the price on unsold land. Graduation failed to pass, but Congress renewed earlier
preemption acts twice during Van Buren's term. At the end of his four years, with significant cuts in
both national spending and revenue, the depression-generated national debt was holding near a
modest $5 million, far less than one year’s outlays.
Meanwhile, rather than having disastrous long-run effects, the combination of state defaults and
repudiations generated a widening circle of benefits. To begin with, it prompted state governments
to make major fiscal reforms. As the distinguished economic historian John Joseph Wallis reports:
“Beginning with New York in 1846, almost two-thirds of the states wrote new constitutions in the
next ten years.  The constitutions restricted state investment in private corporations; limited or
banned incorporation by special legislative act; created general incorporation laws for all types of
business; altered the way state and local governments issued debt; put absolute limits on the
amount of debt governments could issue; and fundamentally changed the structure of the property
tax.”7 Economist Thomas J. Sargent asks in his 2011 Nobel Prize lecture: how likely would such
reforms have been if the state governments had been bailed out by the national government?
States became wary of investing in internal improvements or in anything else. This ensured that as
railroads came to dominate the next phase of the country’s transportation revolution, the states left
development and expansion of this network primarily to the market. State ownership of railways
became negligible, as nearly all the previously state-owned lines were unloaded. Although state
and especially local governments continued to subsidize railroads through some direct investment
and in less conspicuous ways, private sources ended up providing three-quarters of the capital for
American railways prior to 1860.8 Indeed, the period after the fiscal crisis was when most of the
states finally threw off their mercantilist heritage and, for the first time, moved toward a regime of
laissez faire.
At the same time, foreign investors, particularly British, who had acquired about $100 million in
state bonds, now became extremely cautious about loaning money to state governments. Wallis,
along with co-authors Richard Sylla and Arthur Grinath have aptly invoked parallels “with [the less-
developed country] debt crises of the 1980s, the Mexican, Asian, Russian-LTCM, and Brazilian
crises of the 1990s, and the Argentine crisis of the early 2000s.”9 Foreign caution even extended
to the national government. When American agents investigated the possibility of borrowing money
in Europe in 1842, they were told that U.S. bonds could not be sold there because investors feared
that the federal government would also default.10 Moreover, the state constitutional restrictions on
borrowing bequeathed a salutary fiscal legacy that, despite subsequent undermining, has lingered
to the present day.11
Nor did the economic distress of the deflation of 1839–1843 extend far beyond the state
governments and state-chartered banks. Many economists, including Milton Friedman, have been
struck by the comparison between this episode and the Great Depression of 1929–1933.
Qualifying as the two most massive monetary contractions in American history, they were of
identical magnitude and duration. But there the similarities end. During the Great Depression, as
unemployment peaked at nearly 25 percent of the labor force in 1933, U.S. production of goods
and services collapsed by 30 percent. During the earlier 19th-century price decline, investment fell,
but the economy’s total output did not. Quite the opposite, it actually rose somewhere between 6
and 16 percent and real consumption rose even more. This episode was nearly a full-employment
deflation. And once it was over, the country continued to enjoy the sustained economic growth that
had begun in the 1830s, with rising real incomes and increasing prosperity.12
Today, there is a good chance that the U.S. government, like the state governments of the 1840s,
will be forced to default on its explicit and implicit promises within the next few decades. Exactly
how and when is less certain. But the fundamental and massive budgetary changes required to
prevent a fiscal crisis are politically unimaginable. Perhaps only default can impose the necessary
fiscal discipline. Fortunately, the state government experience of the 1840s suggests that this may
provide the best and most durable long-run solution.
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U.S. Doesn't Have the Debt Problems of the EU” and “How and Why a U.S. Sovereign Debt Crisis Could
Occur.” Alex J. Pollock writes “Make the Treasury Responsible for 'Unofficial Debt'.”
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